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I. STATEMENT OF COURT'S JURISDICTION FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW 
This Court has jurisdiction for appellate review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78-2-2(3)0). 
A. Issues Presented for Appeal 
The issue presented for appeal on this decision is whether Sandy City may charge 
a storm drain fee to Jordan School District notwithstanding the provisions of §10-9-106, 
Utah Code ainotated, which prohibits municipalities from charging school districts all 
fees except for those specifically authorized therein. Section 10-9-106 does not authorize 
charging of storm drain fees. (Record 51-62). 
B. Controlling Statute 
Section 10-9-106, Utah Code Annotated, provides in relevant part: 
(2) A school district is subject to a municipality's land use 
regulations under this chapter, except that a municipality may 
not: 
* * * 
(c) require a district to pay fees not authorized by this 
section; 
* * * 
(e) require a school district to pay any impact fee for an 
improvement project that is not reasonably related to the 
impact of the project upon the need that the improvement is 
to address;... 
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II, STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of this Case 
There are no issues of fact in dispute in this matter. The sole issue is whether 
Sandy City may charge Jordan School District the storm drain fee notwithstanding the 
provisions of § 10-9-106. The interpretation of this statute is a question of statutory 
interpretation and is presented to the Court as an issue of law. 
B* Course of Proceedings 
The Jordan School District appeals from the Order of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County by Judge Roger A. Livingston, granting Partial 
Summary Judgment and an Order entered 1 November 2001 Dismissing Remaining 
Claims or Theories Without Prejudice signed by Judge Livingston on 17 December 2001 
and filed with the lower court on 18 December 2001. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The Board of Education of the Jordan School District is a subdivision of the State 
of Utah. (Record 16-18) The Defendant Sandy City Corporation is a municipality 
located within Salt Lake County. (Record 16-18) 
The Jordan School District operates a high school, several middle schools, and 
numerous elementary schools within the boundaries of Sandy City. (Record 16-18) In 
connection with its use of property to provide education to students within the district, 
Sandy City charged, and the School District paid, a one-time hook-up fee to connect 
school storm drain pipes into a system of storm drainpipes constructed by Sandy City. 
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(Record 16-18) The amount of the water connection fee is $3,449.00 for each new 
school constructed by the School District in Sandy City. (Record 16-18) The purpose of 
the hook-up fee is to pay for the cost of construction, maintenance and impact on the 
storm drain system maintained by Sandy City. 
Sandy City also charges a monthly "storm drain fee" to the Jordan School District 
for each school located within Sandy City. (Record 16-18) The amount of the monthly 
storm drain fee depends upon a complex formula set forth in Sandy City Ordinance No. 
99-16, Title 17, Chapter 2 et seq. of the Revised Ordinance of Sandy City (the 
"Ordinance"). (Record 16-18) The Ordinance was passed and approved by Sandy City 
on 11 May 1999. (Record 16-18) Prior to 11 May 1999, Sandy City assessed a monthly 
storm drain fee to the School District in the cumulative amount of $87,262.25. (Record 
16-18) Since 11 May 1999, Sandy City has continued to assess the storm drain fee to 
Jordan School District on a monthly basis. (Record 16-18) 
The purpose of the monthly storm drain fee is purportedly to pay for the 
construction, maintenance, and impact of the storm drain system. (Record 16-18) 
Jordan School District retains the majority of run-off water on its site. (Record 16-18) 
In addition, the Jordan School District uses its storm drains in connection with installing, 
constructing, operating and otherwise using the School District's property and school 
buildings in its statutory obligation to provide education to students within the School 
District. (Record 16-18) 
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D. Summary of Argument 
The Board of Education of the Jordan School District (hereinafter the "School 
District") seeks a declaration of this Court that the storm drain fees assessed by Sandy 
City are barred by §10-9-106(2)(c). A straightforward reading of the statute provides that 
no fees may be assessed to the School District except for those specifically enumerated 
within the exceptions set forth in §10-9-106. The fees which Sandy City now seeks to 
impose upon the School District for hooking into a storm drain system are not among the 
fees which a municipality may permissibly charge to a school district under the 
provisions of § 10-9-106. The language of § 10-9-106 is broad. The statute provides that 
it applies to any operation or other use of any area, land or building owned by the School 
District. Certainly, the storm drain fees are part of the operation of and use of area and 
land owned by the School District. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. History of the Statutory Language 
Prior to 1922, the Utah statutes prohibited cities and counties from "local 
assessments against School Districts." Laws of 1896, Ch. CX X, Article XVI, §149. 
Two cases earlier in the last century illustrate how such local assessments were reviewed. 
In those cases, Salt Lake City imposed assessments. In Board of Education of Salt Lake 
City v. McGonagle, 112 P. 401 (Utah 1910), Salt Lake City imposed an assessment for a 
sewer. In Wey v. Salt Lake City, 101 P. 381 (Utah 1909), Salt Lake City imposed an 
assessment to pave an abutting street. The assessments were payable in annual 
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installments over a period of years and constituted a lien against the properties. The Utah 
Supreme Court struck down these assessments under the statutes then existing because 
School Districts were exempt from such assessments. In each case, the Court noted that 
the assessment constituted a lien on School District property in violation of law and were 
therefore invalid even though the city sought to recover for what it claimed were services 
provided. 
Subsequently, the Utah State Legislature passed §53-4-12, which exempted 
School Districts from paying "local assessments for any purpose." This provision is now 
embodied in §53A-3-408, which states: 
(1) Real and personal property held by a local School 
Board is exempt from general and special taxation and 
from local assessments. 
(2) This property may not be taken in any manner for 
debt. 
In several cases, the Utah Supreme Court held that a fee for services rendered did 
not constitute a "tax or local assessment." In Murray City v. Murray City Board of 
Education, 396 P.2d 628 (Utah 1964), the Court held that the Murray City School 
District was required to pay a one-time sewer connection charge because such a charge 
constituted a "commercial transaction for services rendered and not a tax assessment 
from which School Districts are exempt." The Court then noted that an 
assessment is levied under the tax power and imposed upon 
the property within a limited area for an improvement to 
enhance all property within that area. On the other hand, the 
cost of a service is determined by the benefits conferred upon 
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the occupants of the land rather than increase in the value of 
the land itself. Id. 630-31. 
The Murray City Court noted that laying a sewer pipe, as in McGonagle, or paving 
an abutting street, as in Wey, generally benefitted the property and thus constituted 
assessments. On the other hand, a service fee is based on the value received by the 
School District. 
Similarly, in Salt Lake County v. Board of Education of Granite School District, 
808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that the Granite School District 
was not exempt from a county flood control drainage fee because it constituted an 
"impact fee" rather than a local assessment., The reason that the fee constituted an 
"impact fee" rather than a local assessment was that it was a one-time hook-up which had 
an impact upon an existing system. 
After these cases had been decided, and after § 17A-3-315 had been adopted in 
1992, the Utah Legislature adopted §10-9-106 (applicable to municipalities), which 
provides in relevant part: 
A school district is subject to municipality's land use 
regulations under this chapter, except that a municipality 
may not: 
* * * 
(c) require a school district to pay fees not authorized by this 
section; 
* * * 
(e) require a school district to pay any impact fee for an 
improvement project that is not reasonably related to the 
impact of the project upon the need that the improvement is 
to address;... 
Thus, the primary issue under the statute is whether the amounts charged by Sandy 
City constitute a "fee" that is permitted under this statute. Under §10-9-106(2)(c), if the 
charges by Sandy City constitute a "fee," then they may not be charged unless the fee fits 
within the expressly enumerated exceptions set forth in the subsections of this section of 
the statute. Further, if the fee to be charged is in the nature of an "impact fee," then it 
cannot be charged to the School District without fulfilling the requirement set forth both 
in §11-36-201, Utah Code Annotated et seq. and also enumerated in Call v. City of West 
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1978), and Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 
P.2d 899, 901 (Utah 1981) (specifically enumerating the requirements to impose an 
impact fee). An impact fee means "payment of money imposed upon development 
activity as a condition of development approval." §11-36-102(7)(a). Sandy City may not 
attempt to avoid the express prohibition against imposing fees unless they are authorized 
by §10-9-106 simply by recharacterizing it as a "fee for services rendered." Similarly, 
Sandy City cannot impose an "impact fee" without complying with the express 
conditions to do so. 
Thus, the primary issue under the statue is whether the amounts charged by Sandy 
City constitute a "fee." The Utah Supreme Court addressed the definition of a "fee" in V-
1 Oil Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 942 P.2d 906, 911 (Utah 1996): 
Our cases do not establish a bright line test for distinguishing 
a tax from a fee. Rather "[h]ow such exactions should be 
classified depends on their purpose." (Citation omitted). 
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Generally speaking, tax raises revenue for general 
governmental purposes while a fee raises revenue either to 
compensate the government for the provision of a specific 
service or benefit to the one paying the fee or to defray the 
government's cost of regulating and policing a business or 
activity engaged in by the one paying the fee. (Citation 
omitted). These cases, however, fail to delineate clearly the 
distinction between a tax and a fee.. . . 
We can say, however, that these definitions of a "fee" as 
distinguished from a "tax" suggest that there are at least two 
broad types of fees: (i) a fee for service, i.e., a specific 
charge in return for a specific benefit to the one paying 
the fee, and (ii) a regulatory fee, i.e., a specific charge 
which defrays the government's cost of regulating and 
monitoring the class of entities paying the fee. We analyze 
the surcharge under both concepts to determine whether it can 
be fairly characterized as a legitimate fee under the concept. 
If it cannot, then it is a general revenue-raising measure and 
must be classified as a tax. 
Based upon the foregoing, a fee for services is a "fee." All "fees" are prohibited 
by §10-9-106 unless expressly allowed by the statute in question. Thus, the fee charged 
is a "hookup fee." The fee charged by Sandy City to hook into the storm drain system is 
not a fee authorized under §10-9-106. 
The City has argued that the fees in question apply only during the period of land 
development and the approval phase by cities and counties and not thereafter. However, 
the specific language of the statute in question is contrary to this position. Section 10-9-
106(l)(a) uses very broad language as to the circumstances in which the statute applies: 
Each county, municipality, school district, special district, and 
political subdivision of Utah shall conform to the land use 
and development ordinances of any municipality when 
installing, constructing, operating, or otherwise using any 
area, land or building situated within the municipality and 
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only in a manner and for a purpose that conforms to that 
municipality's ordinances. 
Thus, the statute includes within its scope "operating or otherwise using" any land 
area owned by the School District. Certainly, the School District operates and otherwise 
uses its land in connection with operation or use of its storm drains. The plain language 
of the statute shows that it applies to any operation or use of its land by the Jordan School 
District. 
B. Sandy City Cannot Impose The Storm Drain Fee Upon The Jordan 
School District 
Sandy City asserted in the District Court that §17A-3-315 prohibits assessments of 
School District property from improvements such as a storm sewer system "but permits 
charges for services." The statute states in relevant part: 
Except as provided in subsection (2), a municipality may not 
levy an assessment against a property owned by the federal 
government, the state of Utah, any county, school district, 
municipality or other political subdivision of the state of Utah 
or by any department or division of any such public agency 
even though such property is benefited by improvements 
made, but each such public agency is authorized to contract 
with a municipality for the making of such improvement and 
for the payment of the cost thereof to the municipality. 
Nothing in this section shall prevent a municipality from 
imposing or a public agency from paying reasonable charges 
for any services or materials actually rendered or supplied by 
the municipality to the public agency, including, by way of 
example and not in limitation, charges for water, lighting or 
sewer services. Utah Code Annotated § 17A-3-315( 1). 
Sandy City cites this statute for the proposition that a municipality is permitted to 
assess to school districts charges for water, lighting or sewer services. However, the 
9 
statute does not say anything of the sort. First, the storm drain fee is not like a water or 
light fee where the School District actually consumes electricity or water. Nothing is 
delivered to the School District for consumption. Further, the storm drain system already 
exists and will be serviced regardless of the School District's hooking into it. 
Section 17-3-315(1) expressly provides that a municipality may not levy an 
assessment against property owned by a school district, but expressly authorizes a 
municipality to contract for a fee to provide such services and improvements. In 
addition, this statute states that "nothing in this section" shall be construed to prohibit a 
municipality from imposing charges for services. This statute merely grants power to 
municipalities to enter into contracts to provide services to other governmental entities 
and prohibits assessments except for any services or materials actually rendered or 
supplied by the municipality to the public agency under this particular section. The 
intention of the drafters of this statute is clear: They wanted to make sure that by 
prohibiting municipalities from levying assessments against government property that 
municipalities could nevertheless contract to provide such benefits and this prohibition 
should not be construed to otherwise prohibit municipalities from imposing a fee for 
services. However, the permissive language which allows municipalities to charge a fee 
for services is expressly limited to interpreting this particular section only. This 
section expressly does not apply to the provisions of § 10-9-106, which prohibits 
assessment or imposition of any "fee" against a school district unless expressly allowed 
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by the subsections of that particular section. Thus, §17A-3-315 has absolutely no 
application to this case. 
The School District submits that if Sandy City intends to impose a fee upon Jordan 
School District for a one-time hook-up to its storm drain system, it must impose an 
impact fee and in so doing must first comply with the provisions of §11-36-201 et seq. It 
is true that there is an impact to the system when the Jordan School District hooks into 
Sandy City's storm drain system. However, that impact must be carefully measured 
under the provisions of impact fee statutes and cannot merely be assessed as a monthly 
"fee." Indeed, §10-9-106(c) expressly prohibits such fees. Thus, it is not "illogical" for 
the School District to assert that it is not required to pay a "fee" on a monthly basis to 
Sandy City for a one-time hook-up to the storm drain system. To the contrary, the logic 
of this situation dictates that Sandy City must comply with the provisions of impact fees 
as allowed under §10-9-106 instead of assessing a monthly fee as Sandy City has 
purported to do. 
C. Well Established Rules of Statutory Construction Require This Court 
To Adopt The School District's Interpretation 
The primary rule of statutory construction is to give the statute the plain meaning 
of the language used. Whenever this Court is called upon to interpret a statute, the 
"primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purposes the statute 
was meant to achieve." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). The best 
evidence of the Legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute. See Perrine v. 
Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). Therefore, "where the 
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statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain 
meaning to divine legislative intent." Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 
1168 (Utah 1991). The plain meaning of the language used in §10-9-106 forbids a 
municipality from assessing any type of fee unless the fee is expressly enumerated in the 
exceptions to §10-9-106(c). 
Sandy City urges this Court to find that there is a conflict between §10-9-106 and 
§17A-3-315. Indeed, if the statutes are read as Sandy City urges, for the sake of 
argument, then there is an unavoidable conflict between them because §10-9-106 plainly 
prohibits Sandy City from charging a storm drain fee to the School District in connection 
with its use of its property, whereas §17A-3-315 would allow Sandy City to assess such 
fees. However, it is well-established that this Court must interpret the statutes so as to 
avoid such conflict if it is possible to do so. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Jerz v. 
Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991): "It is our duty to construe each act of 
the legislature so as to give it full force and effect. When a construction of an act will 
bring it into serious conflict with another act, our duty is to construe the acts to be in 
harmony and avoid conflicts." {Citing Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318(Utah 
1983)). There is no contradiction between §10-9-106 and §17A-3-315 because §17A-3-
315 specifically limits the provision that a municipality may impose reasonable charges 
for services or materials actually rendered or supplied to interpretation of the provisions 
of "this section," i.e., to interpretation of §17A-3-315 alone. This Court cannot accept 
Sandy City's suggested interpretation because to do so it must find that §10-9-106 
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conflicts with §17A-3-315. However, the interpretation adopted by the School District 
avoids any conflict. 
Further, in the event this Court were to find that §10-9-106 indeed conflicts with 
§17A-3-315, the Court must interpret §10-9-106 to control over §17A-3-315 because 
§10-9-106 was enacted after §17A-3-315. As the Utah Court of Appeals stated in Ellis v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd, 757 P.2d 882, 884-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988): 
We acknowledge the authority governing implied repeals of 
legislation. As a general proposition, implied repeals are not 
favored and are found only if there is a manifest 
inconsistency or conflict between the earlier and later statutes. 
(Citation omitted) Subsequently enacted statutes relating to 
the same subject matter as previous statutes are, if possible, to 
be construed so as to make the later enactments harmonious 
with the former provisions. (Citation omitted) Nonetheless, 
[W]here a consistent body of laws cannot be 
maintained without the abrogation of a previous law, a 
repeal by implication of previous legislation . . . is 
readily found in the terms of the later enactment. It is 
the necessary effect of the later enactment construed in 
light of the existing law that ultimately determines an 
implied repeal. . . . [Wjhere conflict is readily seen by 
any application of the later enactment in accord with 
[the legislative] intent, it is clear that the later 
enactment is intended to supersede the existing law. 
(Citation omitted) This is so because when there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the 
prior statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new 
provision is deemed controlling as it is the later expression of 
the Legislature. (Citation omitted) (editorial alterations and 
omissions in original) 
Thus, the interpretation of Sandy City must either be rejected in favor of finding 
no conflict between the two statutes or this Court must find that §10-9-106 controls over 
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§17A-3-315 if a conflict is unavoidable. However, the interpretation suggested by Sandy 
City is precisely the opposite of the construction demanded by these rules of statutory 
construction, i.e., Sandy City urges this Court to avoid conflict by ignoring and nullifying 
the plain language of §10-9-106. The basis of the Court's decision must be the simple 
fact that Sandy City may not impose any fees in connection with the use of Jordan School 
District's property unless such fees are expressly permitted in the sub-parts to §10-9-106. 
However, because a storm drain fee is not among the fees that a municipality may impose 
on a School District, this Court must declare that as a matter of law the storm drain fee is 
unlawful. 
IV. THE FEE SANDY CITY SEEKS TO IMPOSE IS AN IMPACT FEE THAT 
FAILS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO ADOPT 
SUCH A FEE 
In addition, Sandy City attempts to avoid its obligation to perform necessary 
studies and assessments to charge an appropriate impact fee by mischaracterizing the fee 
it charges as a "monthly service fee." In fact, Sandy City provides no service. It is 
merely charging for the impact of Jordan School District hooking into its storm drain 
system. An impact fee is a one-time fee as a condition of development approval. 
However, the fact that Sandy City fails to appropriately assess an impact fee as a part of 
its development approval only shows that it has not properly assessed an impact fee. An 
impact fee cannot be converted into a service fee merely by charging it on a monthly 
basis and calling it a service fee. Once again, there is no evidence or even a suggestion 
that Sandy City actually provides any service; rather, it merely charges for the impact of 
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the Jordan School District hooking into its system. School districts would prefer to pay 
a one time hookup fee or impact fee rather than a monthly fee because then they can 
include the cost of the fee in construction bonding and initial construction costs. 
V. PROHIBITING SANDY CITY FROM CHARGING A MONTHLY FEE IS 
MOST CONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
This latter point also resolves the suggestion of Sandy City that it is unreasonable 
to allow the School District to benefit from hooking into the Sandy City storm drain 
system without paying for it. First, there is no evidence that hooking into the storm 
drainage system changes the system any more than natural run-off which must be drained 
regardless. Indeed, it is likely that the School District actually puts less water into the 
system than historical natural run-off because the School District retains almost all water 
on its school sites. The School District is not asserting that it need not pay for the impact 
of hooking into a storm drain system. However, the School District maintains that the 
appropriate fee to be charged is an impact fee which complies with the statutory 
requirements of assessing impact fees in the State of Utah under §11-36-201 etseq. 
Thus, the entire statutory scheme makes eminently good sense. Sandy City may charge 
for the impact upon its system; however, it cannot charge a monthly fee for such services 
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because a monthly fee is not expressly permitted under Section 10-9-106. Any fee not 
expressly permitted under Section 10-9-106 is prohibited. 
DATED this a ^ day of May, 2002. 
BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE 
Blake T. Ostler 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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